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INTRODUCTION
The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was recently enlarged through the enactment of the
Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988 (VJRA).' The VJRA autho-
rizes the Federal Circuit to review the decisionmaking of the United
States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)2 through two judicial
paths. First, the VJRA created a new Article I court, the United
States Court of Veterans Appeals (CVA),3 to review denials by the
* J.D., New York University School of Law; L.L.M., Georgetown University Law
Center. The author is co-director of the National Veterans Legal Services Project and a co-
author of VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL: AN ADVOcATE's GUIDE To REPRESENTING VETERANS
AND THEIR DEPENDENTS (1991), a two-volume practice manual.
1. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
2. Approximately three weeks before it enacted the VJRA, Congress reorganized the
former Veterans' Administration as a cabinet-level executive department. The Department of
Veterans Affairs Act, Pub. L. No. 100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988).
3. 38 U.S.Q.A. § 7251 (West 1991). Article I courts are those created by Congress with
the authority granted it by the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I of the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 8. Article III courts include the United States Supreme Court and "such
inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III,
cl. 1.
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VA of individual claims for federal veterans benefits. CVA decisions
are subject to appeal to the Federal Circuit exclusively.4 Second,
the VJRA transferred jurisdiction from United States district courts
to the Federal Circuit over direct challenges to VA regulations and
other policies of general applicability.5
This Article provides an overview of these two additions to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Part I reviews historical aspects
of judicial review as it has been applied to decisionmaking by the
VA: specifically, past statutory limitations on judicial review and
court holdings that have effectively narrowed those limitations. Part
II discusses the first review path recently established by the VJRA,
whereby departmental decisions are appealable to the Board of Vet-
erans Appeals (BVA) and then to the CVA. CVAjudgments are ap-
pealable to the Federal Circuit and ultimately may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. Part III addresses the sec-
ond review path provided by the VJRA, a track which allows chal-
lenges of department rules and policies directly to the Federal
Circuit and assigns exclusive jurisdiction over such challenges to
that court. Part IV addresses the impact on the Federal Circuit's
docket created or stimulated by the VJRA's two paths for judicial
review of VA decisionmaking. The Article concludes that the impact
on the Federal Circuit so far has been limited although previous re-
straints on attorneys fees have largely been lifted by the VJRA.
Moreover, the docket impact is likely to remain limited until a
greater proportion of the private bar develops a practice in this area
of law.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VA
DECISIONMAKING
The U.S. system of government has a strong tradition that favors
court review of administrative agency decisions. 6 Until the VJRA,
4. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7292 (West 1991).
5. Id. § 502.
6. See STEVEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 28 (1985). Two essential elements of the traditional model of administrative law are
(1) that judicial review be available to ensure accurate and impartial decisionmaking by agen-
cies in compliance with legislative directives, and (2) that agency decisional processes facilitate
the exercise ofjudicial review. Id. Under the traditional model,judicial review is an integral
part of the regulatory process. Although legislative oversight, media scrutiny, and internal
bureaucratic checks also serve to assure that an agency acts properly, heaviest reliance falls on
the independent judiciary to police agency conformance to statutory authorization by review-
ing both factual and legal bases for administrative decisions. Id. In this context, judicial re-
view has two overarching functions: A court serves both as a "quality control" on the
technical soundness of agency decisions, and as a "generalist forum" for reassessing adminis-
trative choices among competing social values. Id. at 371. Courts have historically been avail-
able as of right to persons adversely affected by administrative actions, according to Breyer
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however, most decisions of the VA were exempt from court review.
Congress created the VA in 1930.7 Three years later, Congress ad-
ded provisions prohibiting court review of individual benefits deci-
sions made by the VA.8
Limited exceptions to the general ban on court review of VA deci-
sionmaking evolved. 9 In Johnson v. Robison,10 the Supreme Court
held that 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a), the judicial review preclusion statute,
does not bar federal courts from entertaining constitutional chal-
lenges to veterans benefits legislation.1 The Court's reasoning led
to the development of a body of lower court case law allowing dis-
trict courts to entertain challenges brought under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA)12 to a variety of VA actions. For example,
lower courts ruled that VA regulations, policies, and other actions
affecting the adjudication of claims for benefits were reviewable in
district courts to determine whether the actions were constitu-
tional.13 The lower courts also allowed challenges to VA regulations
to determine whether the regulations were arbitrary and capricious
or whether they violated statutory authority.1 4 The only lawsuits
and Stewart. In order to discharge that responsibility, since they have no special competence
to weigh technical details, costs, and benefits, courts have instead attempted to improve the
quality of agency decisions through controls on the decisionmaking process. Id. at 371.
7. Pub. L. No. 71-536, ch. 863, § 1, 46 Stat. 1016 (1930).
8. Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 9 (1933) ("All decisions rendered by the
Administrator... [or] regulations issued shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law
and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review
9. See generally Kenneth B. Kramer, Judicial Review of the Theoretically Non-Reviewable: An
Overview of Pre-COVA Court Action on Claims for Veterans Benefits, 17 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 99 (1990).
10. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
11. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974).
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1473 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
("A veteran may obtain review, not of his individual claim determination, but of unconstitu-
tional methods employed by the V.A. in arriving at that benefits decision."); Devine v. Cle-
land, 616 F.2d 1080, 1083-85 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that questioning procedural safeguards
in advance of benefits rulings amounts to constitutional challenge of congressional act, not
challenge to agency determination of law or fact); Zayas v. Veterans Admin., 666 F. Supp.
361, 364-65 (D.P.R. 1987) (stating that judicial review is limited to constitutional assessment
of VA regulation and its correct application); Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295, 1300-04
(D. Md. 1975) (stating that review of VA's policy of not according hearing prior to benefits
reduction does not intrude on agency's authority to decide individual claims or develop sub-
stantive policies and is thus outside congressional intent behind "no review" clause). See gen-
erally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a)
Precluding Judicial and Other Review of Administrative Decisions on Veterans Benefits, 18 A.L.R. Fed.
915 (1974 & Supp. 1991).
14. See, e.g., Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding review of challenges to Administrator's authority to promulgate regulations is not
precluded by 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a)); University of Md. v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 98, 100-01 (4th Cir.
1980) (finding that challenges of Administrator's interpretation of statutory authority is judi-
cially reviewable, as neither statutory text nor scant legislative history provide clear and con-
vincing evidence of congressional intent to limit such review by courts); Merged Area X
(Education) v. Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 1979) (maintaining that challenge of
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that the courts consistently dismissed as barred by statute were non-
constitutional challenges to the VA's decisions on individuals' claims
for benefits. 15
The Veterans' Judicial Review Act expanded the scope of section
211(a), recodified in 1991 as section 511(a),' 6 overruling some of
the case law allowing district courts to entertain actions brought
under the APA challenging VA actions. Section 511 (a) now prohib-
its any court from reviewing a decision of the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs on "all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by
the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by the
Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survivors of veterans"
except as provided in the VJRA. 17 In some circumstances, the VJRA
authorizes judicial review of decisions of the Secretary under a law
that affects the provision of veterans benefits in the CVA (with fur-
ther appeal to the Federal Circuit).18 In other circumstances, the
VJRA authorizes direct review by the Federal Circuit.19 Because
section 511 (a) addresses only judicial review of certain decisions by
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. Robison,20 construing section 511 (a) as it existed prior to
the VJRA, should remain good law. District courts should still be
able to retain jurisdiction over lawsuits challenging the constitution-
ality of title 38 statutes because the challenge is to a decision of
Congress, not to a decision of the Secretary. 21
Administrator's authority to promulgate regulations is judicially reviewable, as it does not
overload courts with duty of second-guessing specialized agency on complex and technical
issues); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that 38
U.S.C. § 211 (a) does not preclude review of challenge to Administrator's authority to promul-
gate regulations). Contra Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (declining
to entertain veteran's request for favorable statutory interpretation, as directed to administra-
tor's decision rather than decision of Congress and making negative reference to Evergreen
State, University of Md., and Wayne State).
15. See, e.g., Wickline v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 1391, 1391 (4th Cir. 1971) (refusing to review
VA's denial of claim for disability compensation), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Fritz v.
Director of Veterans Admin., 427 F.2d 154, 155 (9th Cir. 1970) (dismissing veteran's claim
for lack of jurisdiction); Redfield v. Driver, 364 F.2d 812, 813 (9th Cir. 1966) (declining to
review Administrator's final decision on whether veteran's death was caused by service-related
condition, as beyond jurisdiction of court); Barefield v. Byrd, 320 F.2d 455, 457-58 (5th Cir.
1963) (holding that VA decisions need not conform to APA, as Administrator is statutorily
authorized to make own rules and regulations in carrying out VA responsibilities), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 928 (1964).
16. DVA Codification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-83, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 378, 388 (1991) (to be
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 511).
17. 38 U.S.C.A. § 511(a) (West 1991).
18. See infra notes 31-59 and accompanying text (discussing CVA's jurisdiction, stan-
dards, and scope of review, and Federal Circuit's authority to review CVA decisions).
19. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's exclusive
jurisdiction to review direct challenges to VA rules, using APA scope-of-review provisions).
20. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
21. For example, in 1991, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York to challenge the constitutionality of the provision
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Similarly, district courts retain jurisdiction to adjudicate lawsuits
challenging VA actions that are not connected to a decision by the
Secretary that directly affects the provision of veterans benefits. For
example, after passage of the VJRA, two veterans organizations and
several individual veterans challenged the failure of the Secretary of
the VA to comply with the Veterans' Health Programs and Improve-
ment Act of 1979,22 also called the 1979 Agent Orange Act. The
Act requires the Secretary to conduct an epidemiological study of
any long-term adverse health effects in Vietnam veterans that may
result from exposure to the herbicide "Agent Orange." 23
Although implementation of the 1979 Agent Orange Act could
ultimately have an impact on the provision of veterans benefits, the
lawsuit does not challenge a "decision by the Secretary [of Veterans
Affairs] under a law that affects the provision on benefits" within the
meaning of section 511(a). The primary focus of the 1979 Agent
Orange Act is to require that a study be conducted. Although the
results of the study could potentially induce the Secretary to change
the VA's regulations for the provision of benefits, this result would
be secondary to the primary statutory requirement, which does not
itself affect the provision of veterans benefits. Accordingly, section
511 (a) does not bar district courts from entertaining these types of
challenges.
II. DIRECT REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS
APPEALS, WITH FURTHER REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Title III of the Veterans' Judicial Review Act establishes a new
United States Court of Veterans Appeals under Article I of the U.S.
Constitution. 24 Most disputes between a veteran or veteran's de-
pendent and the VA must now be litigated initially in the CVA. The
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, tit. 8, § 8001(a)(l), Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-341 to -342 (1990) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5505(a)) requiring the VA to
withhold service-connected disability compensation to veterans rated mentally incompetent
by the VA if the value of the veteran's estate exceeds $25,000, exclusive of the veteran's home.
Disabled American Veterans v. United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Civ. No. 91-1413
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 27, 1991).
22. Act of Dec. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-151, tit. 3, § 307, 93 Stat. 1092, 1097, reprinted in
38 U.S.C.A. § 527 note (West 1991) (Agent Orange Study).
23. American Legion v. Derwinski, Civ. Nos. 90-1808, 90-1809 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 2,
1990) (referredJan. 16, 1992 to U.S. magistrate for scheduling, non-dispositive motions, and
discovery).
24. VJRA, tit. 3, §§ 4051-4092, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105,4113-22 (1988) (to
be codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251-7298). The major difference between federal courts created
pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution, including the CVA, the United States
Tax Court, and the United States Court of Military Appeals, and those created pursuant to
Article III is that the judges of an Article III court are appointed for life and their salaries
cannot be decreased.
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VJRA provides that the CVA must consist of a chief judge and at
least two, but not more than six, associate judges appointed by the
President.2 5 The term of office for all CVA judges is fifteen years.2 6
The President may, however, remove a judge from office prema-
turely for various specified reasons preventing the proper execution
of the judge's duties.2 7 The CVA commenced operation on October
16, 1989, with a minimum complement of threejudges. By the sum-
mer of 1990, it had a full complement of seven judges. Principal
offices of the court are located in Washington, D.C., near most of
the other federal and local courts.28 Instead of mandating specific
rules of practice and procedure, Congress delegated broad powers
to the CVA to prescribe its own rules.29 Based on the court's experi-
ence with its interim rules, comments of interested persons, and
views of the court's advisory committee, the CVA published Rules of
Practice and Procedure30 in April 1991, modeled on the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The VJRA gives the CVA "exclusive jurisdiction to review deci-
sions of the Board of Veterans Appeals," the highest adjudicative
body on claims for veterans benefits within the VA. 3 ' One who files
a notice of appeal in the CVA is called the appellant3 2 and the indi-
vidual who is sued, normally the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, is
called the appellee.
Only a person "adversely affected" by a Board of Veterans Ap-
peals (BVA) decision may seek review in the CVA. 33 To be "ad-
versely affected" by a BVA decision, and thus have standing to file
suit against the Secretary in the CVA, the claimant must receive less
than the full benefits to which the claimant is, or may be, entitled.3 4
If, for example, a veteran is receiving service-connected disability
compensation and the BVA rules that the veteran's disability rating
should be increased from 30% to 70%, but not to 100%, the vet-
25. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7253(a) (West 1991).
26. Id. § 7253(c).
27. Id. § 7253(0.
28. The Act requires the CVA's principal office to be located in Washington, D.C.,
although the court may sit anywhere in the United States. Id. § 7255.
29. Id. § 7264(a).
30. U.S. VET. App. R. (1991), reprinted in 38 U.S.C.A. app. at 760 (West 1991).
31. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252(a) (West 1991).
32. Id. § 7266.
33. Id. § 7266(a). The court has held that an appeal can validly be filed by a custodian of
a claimant, on behalf of the claimant, if the custodian has a recognized fiduciary relationship
created by virtue of state law or the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Mokal v. Derwinski, I Vet.
App. 12, 14-15 (Ct. Vet. App. 1990). It appears that a veterans organization or a governmen-
tal entity does not have standing to challenge a BVA decision on behalf of an adversely af-
fected individual.
34. Corchado v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 160, 162-63 (Ct. Vet. App. 1991).
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eran can appeal that part of the BVA's decision denying an increase
to 100%. Thus, a claimant who receives some relief from the BVA
may nevertheless appeal the BVA's decision to deny complete relief
to the CVA.
By contrast, neither the Secretary of Veterans Affairs nor any
other VA official may appeal a BVA decision to the CVA. 35 What
logically follows from this is that the CVA has no authority to reduce
benefits to which the BVA has already decided the claimant is enti-
tled. Thus, a claimant cannot end up in a worse position by appeal-
ing to the CVA. If, for example, the BVA rules that the veteran's
service-connected disability rating should be increased from 10% to
30%, but not to 100%, the CVA has authority to reverse that part of
the BVA's decision denying an increase to, 100%, but cannot reverse
the grant of a 30% rating.
With respect to standing, the CVA has adopted the "case or con-
troversy" limitation familiar to both Article III and Article I
courts.3 6 Thus, the CVA by its own restraint will not issue advisory
opinions. Moreover, the VJRA adopts the traditional rule in Ameri-
can jurisprudence that judicial review of agency action is based on a
review of the record created before the agency. 37 The scope of the
review that the court must apply in assessing decisions of the BVA38
is similar in most respects to the scope-of-review provisions of the
APA. 39
Although the VJRA provides that "[i]n no event shall findings of
fact made by the Secretary or the Board of Veterans' Appeals be
subject to trial de novo by the court," 40 the Act makes clear that the
CVA may review almost any issue of law that affects the outcome of a
case over which the CVA has jurisdiction.4 1 Even though the BVA is
bound by VA regulations, instructions of the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, and precedent opinions of the General Counsel of the VA,42
the CVA is not bound by these authorities. Thus, the CVA may over-
turn a BVA decision and order the grant of benefits based on a con-
struction of the law that was beyond the authority of the BVA to
adopt. The CVA can set aside a BVA conclusion of law if the CVA
finds that conclusion to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
35. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252(a) (West 1991).
36. Mokal v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 12, 13-15 (Ct. Vet. App. 1990).
37. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252(b) (West 1991).
38. Id. § 7261.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
40. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7261(c). In particular, the CVA may not review the schedule of ratings
for disabilities as adopted by the Secretary. Id. § 7252(b).
41. Id. § 7261(a).
42. Id. § 7104(c).
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tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or if the conclusion
fails to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements. 43
The decisions subject to CVA review are not just those of the BVA;
decisions of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs or the Chairman of the
BVA are subject to review as well. 44 For example, the CVA has effec-
tively ruled that it may properly review the validity of the Secretary's
actions in adopting regulations, rules of procedure, substantive
rules of general applicability, statements of general policy, and in-
terpretations of general applicability, including opinions and inter-
pretations of the VA General Counsel that fit this description.45
The CVA has made clear that the BVA is not entitled to judicial
deference on conclusions of law. 46 The CVA may review the BVA's
legal interpretations under a de novo standard.47
In most BVA decisions that deny a claimant the full benefits
sought, the disagreement between the claimant and the BVA centers
on the facts. For example, in a claim for service-connected disability
compensation, the BVA may find that the veteran's current ulcer
condition did not have its inception in service, although the veteran
asserts that it did. Alternatively, the BVA may find that the veteran's
mental disability was a personality disorder, which is not a compen-
sable disability, while the veteran contends that it was schizophre-
nia, which is compensable. Because of the central role necessarily
played by the BVA's findings of fact, the degree to which the court is
authorized to scrutinize BVA findings of fact greatly affects a claim-
ant's chance of success in appealing most BVA decisions to the CVA.
Although the CVA may not try facts de novo, the VJRA does give the
court authority to review BVA findings of fact and to set them aside.
The Act provides that the CVA should set aside a finding of material
fact "if the finding is clearly erroneous," 48 a standard Congress has
rarely used for court review of federal agency action. In a landmark
decision, Gilbert v. Derwinski,4 9 the CVA interpreted this standard of
review to coincide with the standard that Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires United States courts of appeals to
apply to findings of fact made by district court judges.5 0
43. Id. § 7261(a)(3).
44. Id.
45. See Fugere v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 103, 109-10 (Ct. Vet. App. 1990) (holding that
VA official's rescission of benefits rule by internal unilateral memorandum violates notice and
comment principles of APA), argued, No. 91-7058 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4, 1991).
46. Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 174 (6t. Vet. App. 1991).
47. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7261(a)(1) (West 1991).
48. Id. § 7261(a)(4).
49. 1 Vet. App. 49 (Ct. Vet. App. 1990).
50. Gilbert v. Derwinski, I Vet. App. 49, 52-53 (Ct. Vet. App. 1990).
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Once the CVA makes a final decision, the Federal Circuit has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to hear appeals of CVA decisions. 51 Unlike the
one-sided appeals process from the BVA to the CVA, in which the
claimant can appeal, but not the VA, a CVA decision can be appealed
to the Federal Circuit by either the individual who appealed to the
CVA or by the VA.52 Appeals to the Federal Circuit must be filed
within sixty days of the final CVA decision. 53 Once the Federal Cir-
cuit renders a final decision, either the VA or the claimant may peti-
tion the United States Supreme Court for certiorari within ninety
days of the final action.54
The authority of the Federal Circuit to overturn a CVA decision is
much more limited than the authority of the CVA to reverse a BVA
decision. The most significant restriction on the Federal Circuit is
that it cannot overturn factual determinations made by the BVA and
reviewed by the CVA, except to the extent the appeal presents a
constitutional issue.55 On nonconstitutional issues, the Federal Cir-
cuit must thus accept the BVA's findings of fact, except to the extent
that the CVA reverses the findings, in which case the Federal Circuit
must accept the CVA's view of the facts.
If the BVA finds, for example, that a claimant does not suffer from
post-traumatic stress disorder in a claim for service-connected disa-
bility compensation, and the CVA rejects the claimant's argument
that this BVA determination is "dearly erroneous," the claimant
cannot appeal this decision to the Federal Circuit on the ground
that the BVA's determination that the claimant did not suffer from
51. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7292(c) (West 1991).
52. Id. § 7292(a).
53. The VJRA states that an appeal to the Federal Circuit "shall be obtained by filing a
notice of appeal with the Court of Veterans Appeals within the time and in the manner pre-
scribed for appeal to United States courts of appeals from United States district courts." 38
U.S.C.A. § 7292(a) (West 1991). 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988) provides "[i]n any such action, suit
or proceeding in which the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the time as
to all parties [for appeal to a court of appeals] shall be sixty days from such an entry [of
judgment, order or decree]." Accordingly, both claimants and the VA will have 60 days from
entry of judgment within which to appeal a CVA decision.
54. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7292(c) (West 1991) ("The judgment of [the Federal Circuit] shall be
final subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari, in the manner provided in sec-
tion 1254 of Title 28."); see 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988) ("[C]ases in the courts of appeals may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any part to
any civil or criminal cases, before or after rendition of judgment or decree."); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2101(c) (1988) ("Any other appeal or any writ of certiorari intended to bring anyjudgment
or decree in a civil action, suit or proceeding before the Supreme Court for review shall be
taken or applied for within ninety days after the entry of such judgment or decree. A justice
of the Supreme Court, for good cause shown, may extend the time for applying for a writ of
certiorari for a period not exceeding sixty days.").
55. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7292(d)(2) (West 1991); see Machado v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 389, 391
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that while CVA has plenary jurisdiction to assess issues of law ap-
pealed from BVA and to review factual determinations under a "clearly erroneous" standard,
court of appeals is limited to reviewing "non-factual" decisions).
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post-traumatic stress disorder was, contrary to the conclusion of the
CVA, "clearly erroneous." On this issue, the CVA decision is final
and unappealable. Conversely, if the CVA does reverse the BVA's
decision on the ground that it was "clearly erroneous" for the BVA
to find that the claimant is not suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder, the VA cannot challenge the CVA's judgment by appealing
to the Federal Circuit on the ground that the CVA erred in conclud-
ing that the BVA finding of fact was "clearly erroneous." In this
scenario, the CVA's decision on this issue is also final and
unappealable.
The primary focus of Federal Circuit review of an appeal from the
CVA concerns the validity and proper interpretation of statutes and
regulations that the CVA relied upon in making its decision.56 The
Federal Circuit is authorized to review the CVA's legal determina-
tions under a de novo standard and can overturn a statute or regula-
tion, or an interpretation thereof, if it concludes that the CVA's
determination is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, uncon-
stitutional, contrary to a statute, in excess of statutory authority,
without observance of procedure required by law, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.57
The gray area regarding the scope of review that the Federal Cir-
cuit has over CVA decisions concerns CVA or BVA interpretations or
applications of statutes and VA regulations. On one hand, the VJRA
states that the Federal Circuit can review any interpretation of a stat-
ute or VA regulation, other than factual determinations, that the
CVA relied on in making the decision. 58 On the other hand, the
VJRA states that "[e]xcept to the extent that an appeal.., presents
a constitutional issue," the Federal Circuit "may not review . . . a
challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular
case." 59 The Federal Circuit has not as yet addressed this conflict
but it may soon be obliged to consider it. In some recent appellate
briefs before the Federal Circuit, both the VA and claimants have
56. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7292(a) (West 1991).
57. Id. § 7292(d)(1); see Prenzlerv, Derwinski, 928 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing
first sentence of 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1), providing that "this court may review the Veterans
Court's legal determinations under a de novo standard.").
58. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7292(a) (West 1991) ("[A]ny party . . . may obtain a review of the
[CVA's] decision with respect to the validity of any statute or regulation (other than refusal to
review the schedule of ratings for disabilities adopted under section 1155 of this title) or any
interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) . . ."); id.
§ 7292(d)(1) ("[The Federal Circuit] shall hold unlawful and set aside any regulation or any
interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied upon
in the decision of the [CVA] ... ").
59. Id. § 7292(d)(2) ("Except to the extent that an appeal ... presents a constitutional
issue, [the Federal Circuit] may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a
challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.").
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asked the Federal Circuit to review interpretations of statutes and
regulations as applied to the individual facts of a case.
III. DIRECT REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
In addition to creating a new court with exclusive jurisdiction to
review BVA decisions, the VJRA also provides the Federal Circuit
with exclusive jurisdiction to review direct challenges to VA regula-
tions, rules of procedure, substantive rules of general applicability,
statements of general policy, and interpretations of general applica-
bility, including opinions and interpretations of the VA General
Counsel that fit this description.60 The Federal Circuit is to review
these direct challenges under the scope-of-review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act.61
Thus, the VJRA effectively transfers jurisdiction over such law-
suits from the district courts to the Federal Circuit. The only regu-
lations affecting the provision of benefits that are beyond review by
the Federal Circuit are regulations that adopt or revise the VA's dis-
ability rating schedule. The VJRA expressly proscribes Federal Cir-
cuit review of the disability rating schedule. 62
The transfer ofjurisdiction from district courts to the Federal Cir-
cuit applies to cases filed on or after September 1, 1989.63 The leg-
islative history of the VJRA makes clear that pending actions filed in
district courts before that date are not intended to be transferred to
the Federal Circuit.64
In summary, the VJRA contemplates that claimants can challenge
VA regulations and general policies that affect their cases through
either of two judicial paths.6 5 First, they may file a direct challenge
before the Federal Circuit. Alternatively, they can appeal their indi-
vidual cases to the BVA, which is bound by VA regulations, "instruc-
tions" of the Secretary, and VA General Counsel "precedent
60. Id. § 502; see also Pena v. Secretary, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 944 F.2d 867, 869-70
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (denying direct review by Federal Circuit because claimant clearly sought
review of particular benefits decision rather than review of VA's making or interpreting rules
and policies); Hilario v. Secretary, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 937 F.2d 586, 588-89 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding that, aside from CVA appeals, Federal Circuit's authority to review VA action
under APA is limited by 38 U.S.C. § 502 to rulemaking, policy, and FOIA publication require-
ments, and may not be extended to agency's application of benefits statutes to facts of particu-
lar case).
61. 38 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West 1991); Hilaio, 937 F.2d at 588-89.
62. 38 U.S.C.A. § 502(c) (West 1991).
63. VJRA, Pub. L. No. 100-687, tit. 4, § 401, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988).
64. See 134 CONG. REC. 31,459 (1988) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell); id. at 37,472-73 (re-
marks of Sen. Cranston); id. at 31,787-90 (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
65. See 134 CONG. REC. 31,470-71 (1988) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); id. at 31,787-90
(remarks of Rep. Edwards).
1992] 865
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:855
opinions." 66 If they lose at the BVA, claimants may challenge the
VA regulation or policy in the CVA as part of an appeal of a BVA
denial, with subsequent review available in the Federal Circuit.
IV. THE CURRENT EFFECT OF THE VJRA ON THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT'S DOCKET
So far, the VJRA has had a more limited impact on the docket of
the Federal Circuit than many observers expected. The reason why
relatively few appeals have been filed with the Federal Circuit pursu-
ant to provisions of the VJRA is apparently that relatively few attor-
neys are willing to represent veterans and their dependents. In
almost all of the appeals filed with the Federal Circuit pursuant to
the VJRA, the claimant veteran has appeared before the court pro
se. This closely reflects the situation at the Court of Veterans Ap-
peals. As of August 1, 1991, of the 3096 appeals filed with the CVA,
2001 (64.6%) of the appellants prosecuted their appeals without a
representative. 67
Veterans appearing pro se are clearly at a severe disadvantage, as
demonstrated by the fact that they experience a poor success rate at
the CVA. A 1991 survey showed that only 21.9% of all pro se appel-
lants were able to get their appeals decided on the merits, with most
of the remainder being dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. 68 By com-
parison, 42.7% of veterans with representation obtained CVA deci-
sions on the merits.69 Of those pro se appellants who were able to
obtain decisions on the merits, only 13% were successful in securing
a reversal or remand of the appealed BVA decision, whereas veter-
ans with a representative were able to obtain a reversal or remand in
46% of their cases. 70 Of the claimants surveyed, only 2.8% of all
pro se appellants obtained a reversal or remand, compared to
19.6% for all veterans with a representative. 71 Most pro se veterans
would prefer to have legal representation. Indeed, a survey con-
ducted in 1991 by the Advisory Committee on Representation of
CVA revealed that only 8% of the pro se appellants responding
66. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(c) (West 1991); seesupra note 42 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that BVA is bound by regulations and precedent opinions).
67. 2 MICHAEL E. WILDHABER, RONALD B. ABRAMS, BARTON F. STICHMAN & DAVID F. AD-
DLESTONE, VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL: AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO REPRESENTING VETERANS
AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 7-31 (1991) (citing COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PRO SE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF VETERANS APPEALS: POSSIBLE SOLtrIONS 3 (Aug. 14, 1991) (draft report)).
68. Id. at 7-32.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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stated they had desired to proceed before the court without a
representative. 72
The problem, therefore, appears to be the lack of advocates will-
ing to represent veterans before the Court of Veterans Appeals and
the Federal Circuit. The scarcity of advocates is undoubtedly a leg-
acy of the stringent attorney-fee limitations that existed prior to the
VJRA; limitations which have discouraged generations of attorneys
from learning and practicing veterans law. Since 1862, Congress
has closely regulated the fee that can be charged by those who act as
a claimant's representative in prosecuting a claim for benefits. 73
Prior to the VJRA, any fee paid to attorneys had to be determined
by the Secretary and could not exceed $10 on any one claim. An
attorney who violated this fee limitation was subject to a maximum
fine of $500 and imprisonment "at hard labor" for a maximum of
two years. 74 In practice, these provisions operated as an economic
barrier preventing members of the private bar from serving as veter-
ans' representatives. In fiscal year 1987, for example, only 705 of
the approximately 40,000 claimants who appeared before the BVA
were represented by attorneys. 75
The VJRA substantially revises attorney fee limitations. The Act
sets no limitation on attorneys fees for litigation in the Federal Cir-
cuit. For services rendered in cases on direct appeal to the CVA, the
appellant and his or her representative are free to negotiate any fee
agreement they desire, subject to two restrictions. First, the advo-
cate must file a copy of the fee agreement with the CVA, which may
order a reduction if it finds that the agreed-on fee is "excessive or
unreasonable." 76 The CVA need not take affirmative action to ap-
72. Id.
73. In 1862, Congress set a $5 cap on the fee an agent or attorney could charge certain
military personnel in applying for a pension, bounty, or other allowance. Act to Grant Pen-
sions, §§ 6-7, 12 Stat. 566, 568 (1862). Two years later, this limitation was raised to $10. Act
ofJuly 4, 1864, §§ 12-13, 13 Stat. 387, 389. Until Congress passed the VJRA in 1988, the fee
cap remained at $10. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1982) (stating that agent's fee shall not exceed
$10 for any one claim), repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4108 (1988). See
generally HOUSE COMM. ON VERANS AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., IST SESs., LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE TEN DOLLAR A'rTORNEY FEE LIMITATION IN CLAIMS OF VERANS' BENEFrTS (Comm.
Print No. 8, 1987) (reviewing fee limitations enacted between 1862 and 1936 and concluding
that Congress has consistently wanted to protect claimants from rapacious attorneys).
74. 38 U.S.C. § 3405 (1988).
75. S. REP. No. 418, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1988); see also Walters v. National Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 312 n.4 (1985) (noting VA statistics showing that 2% of
claimants have lawyers, 86% have "service representatives," and 12% proceed pro se by
choice).
76. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7263(c)-(d) (West 1991). In defining the ceiling on fees as "excessive
or unreasonable," Congress adopted the language of H.R. 5288. See 134 CONG. REc. 31,472-
79 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); id. at 31,472-81 (1988) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
In reporting out H.R. 5288, the House Committee on Veterans Affairs construed this lan-
guage to bar "a fee at an hourly rate in excess of rates charged by a person of comparable skill
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prove a fee agreement. CVA review of the reasonableness of a par-
ticular fee agreement can be initiated by motion of the CVA itself or
by one of the parties, apparently including the VA.77 A decision by
the CVA on the reasonableness of a fee is final and cannot be ap-
pealed to any other court.78
A second restriction in CVA representation involves contingency
fee agreements in which the advocate's fee is to be paid by the VA by
subtracting the fee from the amount of benefits due to the claimant
if the advocate is successful in the case. The VJRA requires the VA
to cooperate by splitting the benefit check between representative
and client. The advocate may not receive, however, more than 20%
of the past-due benefits awarded. 79 The VA cannot give the advo-
cate any share of future benefit checks issued by the VA as a result of
the court victory.8 0 The 20% ceiling does not apply to contingency-
fee agreements that do not involve payment of the fee to the advo-
cate directly by the VA. The only restriction on a contingency fee
paid to the advocate by the client is "reasonableness" as determined
by the BVA, or the CVA on appeal.8'
Although attorneys have been able to charge reasonable fees for
representing veterans before either the CVA or the Federal Circuit
since passage of the VJRA, few attorneys have chosen to represent
veterans in these courts. The impact of the VJRA on the docket of
the Federal Circuit will probably not be significant until a larger seg-
ment of the private bar is willing to learn and practice this area of
law.
in the community in which the representative is normally employed." H.R. REP. No. 963, 100
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5794, 5813-14.
On the Senate floor, Senator Cranston explained why he had dropped the strict dollar caps
set out in S. 11 and agreed in conference with the approach adopted in H.R. 5288, allowing
attorneys to earn "reasonable fees" for representing VA claimants:
In my view, the change to reasonable fees is a positive move. In our meetings to
resolve the differences between the Senate-passed and House-passed versions of S.
11, the House committee expressed concern that the cap as articulated in the Senate
bill could result in veterans [not] being able to retain effective counsel. To quote an
old cliche: "You get what you pay for." Certainly, if we are going to give veterans
real access to judicial review, we must give them access to good, qualified attorneys.
I believe that allowing attorneys to charge reasonable fees will accomplish that goal
and was convinced by the position of the House that its provisions on this point are
preferable to the highly restrictive provisions of the Senate-passed measure.
134 CONG. REC. 31,469 (1988).
77. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7263(c) (West 1991).
78. Id.
79. VJRA, Pub. L. No. 100-687, tit. 1, § 104(a), 102 Stat. 4105, 4108 (1988) (to be codi-
fied at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(I)).
80. Id. (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(2)(A)).
81. Id. (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2)).
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